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Abstract 
China is an extraordinary country; in the last 30 years the economic development 
has moved forward in an almost impossibly high and even speed. The GDP has 
grown with an annual average of ten percent and placed the Chinese economy 
among the top three largest economies in the world. But while the economic 
development keep racing ahead, the democratic development has slowed down 
and is now standing still. This is something that should be impossible according 
the belief of many of political scientists, as it, according to modernisation theory, 
is an inevitability that economic development leads to democracy. So why does 
this not happening in Mainland China? 
In this paper the supposed correlation between these two variables is examined 
closer by studying process between the cause and the supposed effect, or rather 
between economic development and democratisation. By looking at this it is 
revealed that it is not the economic development that that caused the previous 
liberalisation in China instead it is the previous liberalisation that is causing the 
economical growth and development. Hence making liberalisation, or the so-
called democratisation, appear to be the independent variable and the economic 
development the dependent one in the correlation.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Problem 
China. In the last three decades the country has undergone a transformation of 
extraordinary proportion. The economic growth has been on an average of 10 
percent annually. The country has dramatically increased its interaction with the 
international economy, and it has become a dominant figure in world trade. Both 
China's foreign trade and its gross national product have experienced and 
sustained a rapid growth, especially since foreign-owned firms began using China 
as an export platform for goods manufactured there. This change has transformed 
the world economy and with it, the political balance. Hundred millions Chinese 
live a better and freer life today than they could ever have dreamed of under 
Chairman Mao because of it. Being rich is no longer a bad thing but something to 
strive for. People have gained new rights and opportunities that once seemed 
impossible.  
For the past 50 years the correlation between economic development and 
democracy has been one of the most a popular genre within the democratisation 
sphere of political science. The standpoints and belief seems to go in all possible 
directions, everyone publishing their proof, critique and/or support for the various 
theories. But which is true? China is today far from being a democracy, weather it 
is even heading towards becoming one is a heated question. But there is no doubt 
that it has become freer in the last few decades, and much richer. But is there a 
connection between these two developments or not?   
1.2 Aim and Design 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the correlation between economic 
development and democracy by determining how the economical development of 
the last three decades in Mainland China and the democratic sphere of Chinese 
politics have affected each other.  
To simplify this the thesis has been divided into five parts. The first one is this 
introduction chapter, which aims to explain the purpose and design of this paper. 
The second aims to give an insight in the scientific theories regarding the 
correlation between economic development and democracy by presenting 
arguments that both supports and question its causality and very its existence. 
This is followed by the third section, in which some background information 
regarding the chosen case (China) is presented to give a clear view of what has 
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changed in the democratic and economical field since the rise of Deng Xiaoping 
in the later 1970s. The fourth section is intended to examine if a connection 
between the democratic development and the increased freedom within China and 
determine if they are casually related or even related at all. The final section 
concludes the findings and ends the paper. 
1.3 Definitions & Delimitations 
The term “democratic sphere” represents the various conditions that are necessary 
to meet for a state to be considered a democracy, according to the intermediate 
definition of term. Therefore the degree/existence of free and fair elections, 
political rights and freedom, and the power of elected bodies will be the main 
focus of the analysis as well as how they have affected and been affected by the 
economical development.  
It should also be noted that by the term China does not include Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu, Hong Kong or Macau in this paper, merely the 
mainland. 
1.4 Choice of case 
As the aim of the thesis is to study the correlation between democratic and 
economic development the case of China was chosen because of the country’s 
uneven development in the two areas. While economic development is racing 
ahead in an extraordinary speed and is unquestionable, the democratic 
development is currently, according to some, at a standstill. This makes it an 
interesting case as it challenges the hypothesis of interest in a way neither Taiwan 
or Russia ever did. Two cases that both share common historical roots with the 
Chinese case, Russia as a former communist country and a strong supporter of the 
Chinese communists, and Taiwan as it historically has been a part of China, with 
both shared family ties and, in some ways, way of life as well as their history as 
dictatorships.  
1.5 Method 
This is both a descriptive and explanatory paper, taking the form of a case study. 
This because some of the critic the hypothesis of the causal connection between 
economic development and democracy is vulnerable to is rooted in the fact that 
the finding is mostly based on statistics, which means that many other important 
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aspects of the democratisation process were lost. The case study method was 
chosen to appease such critique and allow a focus on the hypothesis itself. 
Case studies enable a more in-depth, longitudinal study, rather than forcing 
one to simply follow a strict protocol and the examination of a limited number of 
variables. Therefore the result offers a sharper understanding of why the chosen 
event occurred along with insights that might become important to look at more 
extensively in future studies. (Flyvbjerg, 2006; 219-242)  
During the research the method of process tracing is also applied; a process 
that is presented in the fourth chapter, which is where the actual analysis is found. 
Process tracing evaluates the historical process between cause and effect and it is 
necessary to pinpoint both the central mechanism and to sort out implications (that 
can actually be observed) for this mechanism. (Teorell & Svensson 2007: 247) 
In other words process tracing is a method intended to identify the causal 
chains and mechanisms between one or more independent variables and the 
outcome of the dependent variable, in this case increased freedom and democracy. 
What differ process tracing from other methods is that it forces the researcher to 
consider all alternative ways the outcome could have occurred and map out other 
possible causal trails that are consistent with the outcome and empirical evidence 
of the process-tracing process of the chosen case. (Esaiasson et al. 2007; 144)     
 
1.6 Material 
Like most case studies this thesis is based on a qualitative research, while this is 
not a must it is most common and as such it is it is unusual for statistic means to 
be used. Rather than trying to understand the world through numbers they focus 
on understanding and exploring it from a human perspective (Teorell. Svensson. 
2007; 264,265). As a result the material used exclude statistics and number 
reliance to most extent. The material used is instead based on already existing 
sources. These sources exist independently from this study in forms of various 
texts and documents (Ibid; 87,89) on the Chinese economic and democratic 
development as well as some literature on the causal connection between 
economic development and democracy written by various scholars and 
intellectuals. 
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2 Economic development = 
democracy? 
The correlation between economic development and democracy is today a fairly 
acknowledged fact among many political scientists. This as only a glance at an 
aggregate pattern is needed to show that there is a strong relationship between 
levels of development and the numbers of democratic regimes (Przeworski et al. 
1997; 156). But the reason behind this correlation remains undetermined, as 
political scientists tend to disagree on the subject. Some claim that democracies 
are more likely to emerge as countries develop economically, while others retain 
the belief that democracies are established independently of economic 
development and some agree with the later but also agree that democracies may 
be more likely to survive in developed countries, and the versions go on. Because 
of these differences the literature on the subject is both detailed and varied. Much 
however jumps off the Lipset hypothesis first published in 1959 in which he 
claims a causal connection between the two. This literature mainly includes 
theories of modernisation, dependency and globalisation (Gallagher. 2002; 339). 
However, some of these ‘jump-offs’ are sceptics, Harvard professor James A. 
Robinson is one such sceptic. He claims that the correlation between the two 
variables, income per capita and democracy, make it seem like there is a causal 
connection, but in reality it only appears to exist because “the same features of a 
society simultaneously determine how prosperous and how democratic it [a 
country] is” (Robinson. 2006; 503). 
In this chapter both advocates and sceptics are be given a section each in which 
short presentations of their viewpoints are presented. 
2.1 The advocate’s perspective 
Lipset, who, in many ways, has become the father of this casual connection 
hypothesis, determined his standpoint by observing various indicators of 
economic development, such as: wealth, industrialisation, urbanisation and 
education (Lipset. 1959; 75). Since the theory is based on the idea of a casual 
relationship it means that economic growth will bring forth democracy regardless 
to other conditions, weather that is the intent or not. The economic development 
should therefore, according to a modernisation theorist, be encouraged 
everywhere as it will help establish the only real internal conditions for a lasting 
democracy, in his opinion; education and wealth (Ibid;50). His theory claims that 
it is only a society with an educated, wealthy population can resist the appeal of 
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demagogues. A stable democracy also presupposes a certain level of accumulated 
human, social, and physical capital. This as education promotes growth, and in 
turn might also independently promote political pluralisation by reducing the costs 
of political action in support of relatively democratic regimes. The schooling 
makes democratic revolutions against dictatorships more probable and successful 
antidemocratic coups less probable. And schooling in turn is a result of economic 
development (Rowan. 1999:39-40). In other words the basic assumption of 
modernisation theory, in any of its versions, is that “modernisation consists of a 
gradual differentiation and specialisation of social structures that culminates in 
separation of political structures from other structures and make democratisation 
possible” (Przeworski et al. 1997;158).  
Various political and economical scientists have, repeatedly, found support for 
this hypothesis, among them is Robert J. Barro. He found that higher incomes and 
higher levels of (primary) education predict higher freedoms. He also found 
significant time lags between the appearance of a factor positive for electoral 
rights and its expression in politics. He interpreted such lags as tokens of 
inactivity in institutions affected by changes in economic and social variables, and 
noted that after about two decades “the level of democracy is nearly fully 
determined by the economic and social variables.” (Rowan. 2007;40) 
2.2 The sceptic’s perspective  
Robinson is far from alone in his scepticism of the casual correlation, and Lipset’s 
1959 hypothesis, or even his scepticism of the genuinely of correlation between 
the two variables. There is in fact an entire sea of critics. O’Donnell, Lipset’s 
most influential critic, attacked Lipset’s theory when he in 1973 stated that the 
casual connection between per capita income and democracy were lacking 
explanatory power (in the case of Latin America) and paraphrased Lipset’s thesis 
as saying that “if other countries become as rich as the economically advanced 
nations, it is highly probable that they become political democracies.” 
(O’Donnell. 1973;3). Which in turn would mean that democracies are dependent 
on the authoritarian regime, since they are born as a result of an authoritarian 
regime. O’Donnell himself claims that economic development leads to 
authoritarianism as the middle class starts to fear the industrial workers’ power, 
and the call for a strong man, rather than democracy, at least in the case of Latin 
America (Knutsen. 2008; 9). 
Even earlier, in 1966, Moore criticised Lipset’s work, claiming to see no 
simple process of modernisation in the modern world according to which higher 
income per capita leads to greater democracy. He instead claimed that prosperity 
and democracy could only go together under some specific circumstances 
(Robinson. 2006;503-04). To gain democracy he means that a “reduction in the 
overall size of the peasantry and the end of its organic dependence on the landed 
class” is necessary, as well as “a replenishment of upper-class interests around the 
dominance of commercial and industrial interest” (Grugel. 2002; 52f) Alternative 
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conditions lead to communist revolution or fascism rather than democracy. 
(Robinson. 2006;503-04)    
Another critique is that Lipset based his conclusions on the positive 
correlation between economic development and democracy displayed by cross-
sectional data, but a longitudinal analysis shows different results with ”widely 
varied relationships between levels of socioeconomic development and 
democracy. [And that] It is clear that democracies are nor a one-way ladder that 
countries climb as their economy and social structures develop” (Arat. 1988; 33).  
While other correlation and regression analyses by Cutright, Cutright and 
Wiley, Smith, and Coulter have provided empirical support for a positive linear 
relationship between levels of economic development and democracy in a system. 
The linearity of the relationship has been questioned by the "threshold 
phenomenon" argument of Neubauer and Jackman as these two found no 
significant relationship between economic development and democracy in a 
system for highly developed countries. However, it does suggest that in the lower 
stages of economic development, increases in economic development level lead to 
increases in the level of democracy. (Ibid; 23) A claim strengthened by 
Przeworski and Limongi in their 1997 article Modernization: Theories and Facts. 
In the article they present findings and their “thresholds” for when the economical 
development might help the birth of democracy and when it has the opposite 
effect.  
According to their studies dictatorships survive, or at least succeed one 
another, almost invariably in the poorest countries, those with a per capita income 
under $1000. They are somewhat less stable in countries with income between 
$1001 and $4000 and even less in those above $4000. But if the survive and reach 
the $6000 threshold transition to democracy, once again, become less likely. The 
probability of any dictatorship dying during any year, for those dictatorships with 
an income over $6000, is 0.0484 and over $7000 is 0.0333 and so on. In poorer 
countries, in the so-called risk zone, with an income of $5000, the survival rate is 
0.0641 but in the poorest, with an income under $1000, the risk is as low as 
0.0206. (Przeworsk et al. 1997;159-60). This means economical development, to a 
certain degree, may aid a democratisation process, but if it develops enough 
without bringing democracy it will start having the opposite effect and instead 
strengthen the sitting authoritarian regime. Something that would fits well with 
Huntington’s belief that dictatorships have a “bell shaped pattern of instability” 
(Huntington. 1968;43). It also concludes that the causal power of economic 
development in bringing democracy appears faulty.  
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3 Situations Then & Now 
In 1976 Chairman Mao Tse-tung meet the end if his life and left the China he had 
created without its ‘god’. For decades ‘the little red’ had been the Chinese 
equivalent of the Christian bible, with Mao as its god and saviour. His word was 
law and his moods and actions had governed the world’s most densely populated 
country and led the country to financial, social and political ruin for decades. By 
the end of his rule there was not a shred of economical or personal freedom in the 
millennia old country. But over the last 30 years this has been changing at an 
extraordinary pace.  
In this chapter two aspects of the change, the economic situation and the 
democratic situation, will be given a short description to offer a better view of just 
how much things have changed. This as there is some discussion regarding the 
democratisation process in China and weather it exists or not and to certify the 
changes in the economic situation. 
3.1 Democracy 
To say that China is well on the way to become a democracy might be overstating 
things. Though there are people who claim differently, Henry S Rowan is one 
such man. In his opinion China will be a free democracy by 2025 (Rowan. 2007; 
48). But there are few that would agree with his assessment.  
While the economy is moving a head in a rapid pace, democratisation does not. 
There have however been significant changes in this area as well, and the country 
is far freer today than it was 30 years ago. But that does not mean that only 
improvements have occurred either. When Deng Xiaoping came to power the 
lives of the people were ruled by the Communist Party with an iron fist. That is 
not to say that they are not still, but the economical liberalisation has brought with 
it many changes, as you will later see. 
3.1.1 Then 
Under Chairman Mao’s rule the Chinese people lost their right to property and 
their freedom of speech became more limited than before. Rights that even the 
most basic definitions of the term democracy demands were limited or never 
developed. But the victory of the Communist Party and regime was not all bad. 
The communist actually brought peace, security and relative social stability by 
Chinese standards. Before the communist they had spent more than 150 years 
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struggling to escape war, chaos and famine. As a result both the government and 
the people agree on the importance of order, and therefore accept many rules 
much easier than other cultures would. The Party also put much effort into 
healthcare, education and equality. Every person received the right to a job and 
was guaranteed one for life, though these jobs and housing were not chosen by the 
individual but by the state. (Ogden. 2002; 234-140) Neither of these two rights 
exists today, instead China has a growing problem with unemployment and 
shantytowns, something that did not exist roughly 30 years ago.  The increased 
education and equality focus of this time should however have aided a democratic 
movement according to various democratisation theorists, yet it instead came to 
aid Deng Xiaoping and his reforms in the future which seem to stall 
democratisation. 
3.1.2 Now 
In year 2000 the U.S. State department described the Chinese government as “… 
quick to suppress any person or group, weather religious, political or social, that 
they [perceive] to be dangerous to government power, or to national stability” 
(U.S. Department of State. 2000). Never the less, compared to 20 years prior the 
Chinese state has become more lenient and things have changed.    
While the media sector remains largely monopolised by the state, and the 
government continues to keep a close eye on what is published, issues considered 
less sensitive, such as finance and sports, coverage has become increasingly 
lively. The initial public offering of Liaoning Publishing and Media in December 
2007 was the first time that a media company had been floated on the stock 
market without the editorial section having been first hived off. This may be a 
sign that a gradual move towards full commercialisation of the sector is on its way 
according to The Economist. Aside from this a number of foreign television 
stations have been permitted to broadcast in some areas, as long as they accept 
state restrictions on content. Also, radio is a lively medium in China, with "talk 
radio" shows providing a forum for frank discussion of social and other problems. 
(The Economist. 09.01.28)  
And despite the lack of institutional checks and balances and guarantees of 
freedom, many members of the government, especially at senior levels, feel the 
need to respond and react to public opinion, and this introduces a significant 
element of accountability into the process of government. Moreover, China's 
government is far more efficient than most other authoritarian regimes, delivering 
economic growth and public services effectively in much of the country. But 
while the government may seek to represent and serve the public, it is clear that 
the refusal to bow to "foreign" concepts of democracy and to surrender the 
supremacy of the Chinese Communist Party means that China's political leaders 
will inevitably fall short in their attempts to achieve this goal. (The Economist. 
09.01.28) 
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3.2 The economic situation 
Due to the Cultural Revolution, the Great Leap Forward, and the country’s severe 
underdevelopment China was one of the poorest countries in the world when 
Deng Xiaoping came to power. The country was, mildly put, unstable, both 
politically and financially, and fundamental changes were a deeply needed. 
3.2.1 Then 
While much can be said about Chairman Mao and his politics it is no doubt that it 
was under his rule China began her industrialisation, causing an economic growth 
rate of 64 percent decanally between 1952 and 1972 (Meisner. 1999; 417-18), and 
with this began the extraordinary tale of China: the economical wonder. Although 
it would take years before the main contributor to this tale would step in.   
The economical success, however, did not benefit the average citizen. Under 
Chairman Mao the entire private sector of the urban economy became 
nationalised and the agriculture collectivised, private property became forbidden. 
This in turn was an act that brought the economies of both cities and countryside 
under state control. Leaving the industrialisation entirely in the hands of the state, 
making the state not only the political master of society but also its sole 
economical master. (Ibid; 420, 422) 
It would take decades, and the deaths of both Chairman Mao and Zhou Enlai, 
before any of the riches would reach the ordinary people. The first step was in 
1977 when Deng Xiaoping’s 1975 proposal that both industrial productivity and 
production would grant greater material rewards for the workers, became reality 
(Ibid; 429), something that re-introduced the capitalistic drive in China.  
A year later, at the end of 1978, Deng came in to power, introducing the 
much-needed fundamental economic reforms that would make China a giant on 
global economical and political market. Increasing the GDP per capita from $251 
in 1980 to $5962 in 2008 and in doing so changing the lives of more than billion 
human beings, some for the better and some for the worse. (Economywatch. 
09.08.10) 
3.2.2 Now 
Today China’s economy is booming. It is the third largest economy in the world, 
behind only USA and Japan (cnn.com. 09.01.15). The years of nationalised 
economies and collectivised agriculture are long gone. The agricultural collectives 
have been de-collectivised, the non-agricultural private sector has grown rapidly, 
and government priorities have shifted toward light and high technology, rather 
than heavy industries (Britannica. 09.08.15). 
As China has dramatically increased its interaction with the international 
economy, it has also become a dominant figure in world trade, speeding up its 
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economical growth even further. Because of this both China's foreign trade and its 
gross national product have experienced sustained and rapid growth, especially 
since foreign-owned firms began using China as an export platform for goods 
manufactured there. Giving the country an economically bright future. 
(Britannica. 09.08.15) 
The large industrial market has brought people running to the to the cities to 
try their luck and in hope of giving their families better lives. Today the annual 
rate urbanisation is 2,7 percent and already the urban dwellers make out 43 
percent of the Chinese population (CIA. 09.08.10). Yet many become 
disappointed. In the cities most are greeted by unemployment and poverty. The 
new reforms and policies may give the people the right to move as they wish and 
try their luck elsewhere, in theory, but in reality the people coming as immigrates 
from the countryside to the city are viewed as a second class citizen, without 
citizen rights. They are for example without access to local healthcare, workplace 
protection and education (Ford. 2007; 60). But still the shantytowns keep growing 
as the rural population try to get their piece of the economic wonder that is 
modern China. 
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4 Analysis 
The economic development in China has affected both the political and personal 
lives of over a billion people. Over the last three decades China become true 
power in world politics. It retains a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, it 
is a giant on the financial market and it has the world’s largest Internet market 
with 253 million users. Yet the single-party regime that has been governed the 
country for the better half of a century remains in power and the country shows 
only the tiniest hints of ongoing democratisation, if any. While there is no doubt 
that the economic growth and development has made the people freer the question 
as to what degree is debatable. In this chapter the influence the economic 
development has had on the democratic sphere of Chinese politics is analysed. 
This is done in three sections, each representing one of the three elements of an 
intermediate democracy, to see if China is coming closer to fulfilling them or not, 
and what impact the economic development has had on them. 
4.1 Political Rights & Freedom? 
In 2009 Freedom House gave China a seven in political rights and a six in civil 
liberties, giving the country the over all status; Not Free. But this does not mean 
that the country is not freer today than it was under Chairman Mao. The economic 
liberalisation in 1979 has led to many improved material conditions and increased 
options, opportunities and rights. Of which quite a few new rights can be seen as 
increased democracy (Ibid; 142). 
Under Chairman Mao the Chinese people was completely brainwashed, and 
what they heard about the outside world were atrocious lies aimed to give the 
people pride in their country, stop any desire they might have to leave it and/or be 
influenced by it. The capitalistic west was beyond horrible and Chairman Mao 
could do no wrong. With these lies China was completely under the Communist 
Party’s control.  
But today the people have the right of free speech and access to information, 
though there are limitations. While it is lacking in comparison to western 
definitions of the right, today’s China is much more accepting than the Soviet 
Union ever was and the state tolerance is growing. They are, for example, often 
lenient regarding certain areas of the Chinese policy on censorship, which was 
finally given official guidelines in 2000. According to which “penal actions may 
result if publications, broadcasts, and performances question the leadership of he 
Chinese Communist Party, contradict key party and state policies, reveal military 
or other state secrets, threaten social stability, disregard government policies on 
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ethnic minorities, or contain pornography. Publishing houses and other media 
that fail to observe these new guidelines may have their editorial committees 
restricted, receive warnings, be suspended or even be shut down.” While they still 
hold a hard on most aspects of this, the state hardly put any effort in dealing with 
the pornography industry in China, which leaves room to wonder for the future. 
(Ibid: 143-44) As for the repercussions if the rules are not followed, most seem to 
follow the guidelines. There is however some that has received harsher 
punishments, according to amnesty internationals 2008 report. According to this 
around 30 journalist and at least 50 other individuals are imprisoned today for 
posting their views on the Internet (Amnesty International 2008; Freedom of 
Expression). But considering the size of the country, pure logic would suggest that 
this a miniscule number compared to the number of people that are likely to have 
committed any of this type of ”crimes” and while complete freedom and none 
imprisonments would have been to prefer the critic China receives because of this 
seems to be something that are often blown completely out of proportion. 
Especially since critic of party officials and policies are allowed as long as they 
don’t go directly against the guidelines stated above. 
Critics of other aspects of the government are however welcome to air their 
complaints on air during live radio and televised talk shows, which were 
unimaginable before Deng Xiaoping. The Chinese press is becoming an 
investigative branch of society and often influence policies and juridical systems 
in China. Television is also exposing the Chinese to subject that previously was 
taboo and to lifestyles and genres of music and art they didn’t know existed. This 
is partly thanks to the need for attract the advertising the television channels need 
to stay in business, advertising that only will come if the programs attract viewers. 
(Ibid; 149-50) 
But also other areas within the sphere of free speech and access to information 
are freer than western media would have people believe. One such area is the 
Internet, and its restrictions, which was a popular subject during the Beijing 
Olympics in 2008, something that has resulted in a very pessimistic view of the 
Chinese Internet among ordinary westerners. I myself was in China with my 
family at this time and when some pictures wouldn’t load on my brother’s 
computer he immediately assumed that they had been censored, rather than 
blaming a slow Internet connection (which was the responsible party). Also some 
of my friends were quick to assume that I no longer would be able to use the 
popular online community ‘facebook.com’ during my visit to China, which I had 
no problem accessing. It should therefore be said that the Chinese government has 
not only permitted but also encourage the spread of the Internet and virtually 
everyone with a phone and modem can sign up, despite the occasional 
government efforts to restrict unlimited access. From 1995 to 2001 the number of 
Internet users grew from 50 000 to 22 million and it continues to grow and in 
January 2009 China became the internet market in the world with around 250 
million users. The use of the Internet allow Chinese a far wider variety of options 
and information than is permitted in the mass media, such as reports on the 
government crackdown on the Tiananmen Square 1989 and the information 
spread is much larger and faster because of it. It is simply impossible for the 
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government to control the Internet as tightly as other spheres in Chinese society, if 
the desire is there people can find information on almost anything, including sites 
that advocate Tibetan independence. But the real danger in the eyes of the 
government is the many chat rooms that have appeared online, and the comments 
made in them, rather than news on websites. There are thousands of chat rooms 
were people can vent their anger. Yet the government allows them to remain as 
they also offer some benefits for the state since they work as a window to public 
opinions. Some of the comments, those that are considered too critical of the 
Party, are however deleted by the “chat room mama” within minutes of the 
posting. Yet, comments such as “We Chinese people don’t like our government” 
or “The Communist Party doesn’t let Chinese people read newspaper from 
overseas” are allowed to remain. But most Chinese have no interest in using 
Internet to bring down the government or discuss politics. Like in the rest of the 
world it is mainly used for business, commercial and social purposes, 
entertainment and information on non-politic related subjects. And as long as the 
benefits of liberalisation outweigh the possible costs, the Internet will remain a 
large part of modern Chinese society, business, political and private. (Ibid; 144-
47) 
The second right is the right to privacy. Again, the Chinese definition differ a 
great deal from the western, but it should not be disregarded because of it, this as 
also here the changes are significant. The enhancement of the right to privacy in 
China however is not due to new laws or policies specifically to protect privacy. 
Instead it is an indirect result of economic liberalisation, emerging property rights 
and government decisions to not enforce certain laws and policies that restrict 
privacy. The increased privacy has in turned given the Chinese people more alone 
and free time, for which they need to find entertainment which has resulted in 
people making more choices, rather than being mindless work drones. It has given 
them time to exercise their individual rights, an important step for 
democratisation. (ibid; 164, 168-69) 
The third right is the right to choice of consumer goods. Psychologically 
speaking people who can choose from verity of goods in plenty of supply feel less 
dependent on the state for their material welfare (Ibid; 169). Hence this 
development is very important from a democratic viewpoint and completely 
dependent in the economic development, this as the monetary increase in the 
China and for the citizens are essential for such a development to occur. More 
independence means less acceptance in regard of tyranny and oppression.  
Also the right to costumer protection illustrates the governments desire to 
advance the rights of it’s citizens. The fact that they have established over 45 000 
organisations to deal the problem of fake products and copyrighting violations for 
the people’s protections is most impressive in even post-industrial societies, and 
certainly in China. (Ibid; 170,172) 
Perhaps more important is the right to choose one’s work and change one’s 
domicile. The right to choose one’s own job and the right to change jobs rather 
than having a state-assigned job is a luxury the economic liberalisation brought 
with it. This as the free flow of workers and capital is a key element in the modern 
market economy China established in 1979. Workers became free to change jobs 
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and establish their own residence, just as farmers became allowed to leave the 
countryside and seek employment in the cities.  It is however very difficult for the 
later group to change to urban residency because of China’s tightly held 
household registration system, and many end up without both homes and jobs. 
They become part of the city’s scum and the long time residences often pressure 
the government to destroy their shantytowns and to round them up and send them 
back to the countryside. (Ibid; 173, 175) But even the right to try to get a better 
life in the city is more than most Chinese growing up in Mao’s china thought 
possible. 
The right to personal style is a result of the increased individualism that has 
been introduced in China over the last 30 years. A person is no longer part of a 
collective in which one style fits all. It might seem like a rather insignificant right, 
but when people start making decisions about their lives on daily basis rather than 
just blindly listening to the party-state they will also become prepared to think 
more independently on other issues and this change of mindset is critical to 
democratisation. (Ibid; 175-76) 
Other new rights, such as the right to get rich, to inherit money and property, 
buy and sell stocks, and acquire hard currency, are naturally also important 
markers in the Chinese economic development as well as the democratic 
development as these rights all ties the economic and democratic spheres of 
Chinese politics tightly together. It is in aim of fulfilling these rights many of the 
other rights has come into existence. They are also the roots of many of the rights 
discussed above. This however makes one question why the economic 
development in China is speeding ahead while the democratic development is 
more or less standing still today. 
But then again, the economic development has also brought with it some 
elements that go straight against the aim of democracy. One such thing is the 
emphasis on the subordinate role of women and the role of exploitive practises, 
such as prostitution, preferential hiring of men, and violence against women, has 
returned after having nearly been extinguished under Chairman Mao. The 
elimination of the woman quota in provincial and national people’s congresses 
and women representation in the legislative assemblies made the number 
noticeably decrease. Another is the heavy increase of crime, just between 1985 
and 1990 the crime rate increased with nearly 400 percent. Also rural health care 
has taken a significant turn for the worse since the reforms, urban health care on 
the other hand is excellent. (Ibid; 134, 138, 180)      
4.2 No Power to Non-Elected Bodies? 
While China escaped the European colonisation in Asia, it did not escape foreign 
influence or power, which was especially strong after the loss of the opium wars 
in the 19th century. This influence remained until Chairman Mao came to power 
and closed China off from the rest of the world and external powers. Instead all 
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political and economical power fell to the Communist Party and the People’s 
Liberation Army, which now functions as the Chinese national military.  
While China’s political leaders may call China a socialistic democracy, very 
little of the power falls to any elected bodies. But this was never intention of the 
government either, unlike the claims of the nationalist party that had to flee to 
Taiwan in 1949 after their defeat on the mainland. The reforms are not aimed to 
slowly phase out the one-party state but simply to do just that; reform The 
government has repeatedly stated that the reforms are not aimed to democratise 
and that China never will become a democracy of the western kind (Ljunggren. 
2008; 175-76). But that is not to say that changes have not occurred in regards of 
how the political power is divided.  
Today, for example, the influence of the People's Liberation Army had over 
government policy has waned in most aspects, partly as a consequence of 
government policies to wind down the military’s commercial ventures, but also 
reflecting a quid pro quo as the military budget has been increased well above the 
rate of the growth of the economy. (The Economist. 09.01.28) But that is not to 
say it doesn’t still hold much power. The PLA was founded to be directly under 
the Communist Party’s rule and is still today a power source for consolidating the 
Party’s power in China (Ibid; 174). 
But while the government still maintain almost all the political power in the 
country, they have done notable concessions in many areas, giving some of that 
power to the people. Though this is mostly a result of the economical reforms or 
to keep the new market economy afloat, or possibly to appease certain power 
threatening movements, rather than to stimulate a democratisation process in the 
country. There is also little that indicates any real power distribution from 
government to the people in the near future, at least not more than has already 
occurred.  
There are however local elections taking place in today’s China and the 
elected are given some real political power for local use. The elected in rural areas 
are responsible for tasks such as maintaining irrigation cannels, repairing bridges, 
mediating disputes and operation school and health centres, as well as making 
sensitive local decisions such as allocating land for housing constructions and 
relocating farmland among families.  They are also made responsible for 
providing food, cloths, housing, medical care, funeral expenses for childless and 
infirm elderly, helping the poor, supporting the army and giving preferential 
treatment to families of those who fought in the revolution, as well as for 
preventing gambling and “superstitious activities”. (Ogden. 2002; 186-87)  
Though they doubtlessly hold more power than for example the Swedish 
county administration employees do when it comes to things such as land 
allocation. The elected do in some ways seem more like elected social workers 
and civil servants than politicians. 
The elected in urban election have much less power and have fewer 
responsibilities than those in rural regions, but their power has grown since they 
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took over tasks that previously belonged to the work units1 (such as welfare 
responsibilities and the work unit’s role as grass-roots implementers of Party’s 
policies). They also functions as mediators in neighbourhood and family disputes, 
preventing crimes, managing social welfare services, overseeing campaigns such 
as those against the Falungong etc. Moreover the government itself handed over 
many of its managing functions to them when it was restructuring its operations, 
furthering the power of the elected. (Ibid; 222-23) 
But any real national elections are not going to happen any time soon in the 
visible future. The local rural and urban elections are as close to elected bodies 
that can be found in today’s China. Non-elected bodies are still the one with the 
power, as it has been for thousands of years in China. The growing middleclass, 
which many westerners and political scientists expect to bring forth democracy, 
show little interest in doing anything about this. According to professor Jonathan 
Unger the Chinese middleclass is in its nature elitist and because of this many 
have no wish to bring forth democracy. Instead they have become the footing for 
the current regime and tend to support it. Rather than aiding democratisation they 
are more likely to stand in its way. (Ljunggren. 2008; 188-89) As   
4.3 Fair & Free Elections? 
China is today an authoritarian state. There are no national elections to speak of. 
There is however some local elections held in rural and urban China, elections 
that have earned much attention among aboard.  
The rural elections are intended to choose representatives for the village 
committee. The committee deals with various tasks that party officials deem less 
important as they do nothing to further their carrier, but that none-the-less are 
necessary for the country and its development. (Ogden. 2002; 186-87)  
The elections follow seven principles much similar to those of any western 
election. These seven principles are; direct election, more candidates than number 
of offices, secret ballads, majority vote, elections every three year, public 
counting of ballads and the right for candidates to campaign. But there is one 
notable difference between the Chinese election and most political elections in the 
west; the candidate does not have to belong to a party, however, he/she must 
effectively implement the Party’s policies in his/her area. (Ibid; 188)  This is 
especially notable considering the previous importance placed on the Party 
membership, though its influence has been phasing out since the reforms began. 
But the question why the elections started remains. 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1 Prior the economic reforms a work unit acted as the first step of a hierarchy linking each 
individual with the central Communist Party infrastructure. Work units were the principal method 
of implementing party policy. Also workers were bound to their work unit for life. Each work unit 
created their own housing, childcare, schools, clinics, shops, services, post offices, etc. This is no 
longer the case. 
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Officially speaking one of the first steps of Chinese economic reforms and 
development was the de-collectivisation of rural land. But the question if this 
really was the real reason behind the decision remains, since there are some 
indications that it was the fear of a rural uprising that motivated the change. While 
43 percent of the Chinese population live in urban settlements today, back when 
the reforms started the number was much lower and a crushing majority of the 
population lived and worked in rural areas. But due to the inefficiency of the 
collectives people had already begun to ignore them and had re-divided the land 
and ignored the Party. The official de-collectivisation can therefore be seen as an 
attempt to regain control of the countryside, but even this was not enough to calm 
the rural population. The installation of the new household responsibility system, 
which replaced the collectives, did not solve the problem as much as it brought 
new problems for the Party. The assaults on tax collectors and refusal to hand 
over the quotas of grain to state deposits remained a common occurrence. People 
also started to ignore the government regulations on family size since they needed 
the extra workforce for their land. This in turn resulted in such instability that it 
threatened very the existence of the Communist Party in rural areas.  Therefore it 
is some times claimed that it was in an attempt to deal with this rising lawlessness, 
chaos and collapse of the administrative and financial order that the rural village 
elections came to be, rather then just the desire to aid the county’s new market 
economy. (Ibid; 183-84, 220) 
But even the elections have not brought complete stability on the countryside, 
over the years 30 000-40 000 attempts to remove village leaders has occurred, 
though few have been successful as the rural power elite help their own. Yet the 
elections remain and there are even plans to attempt to test another kind of 
election. This election would be a kind of primary election for post of local Party 
secretary in hopes of getting less corrupt and more respected local secretaries. 
(Ljunggren. 2008;185)  
The urban elections are run in much the same fashion as the rural elections but 
grant far less power to the elected than the rural elections do, mainly because they 
are not focused on any form of self-governance. In the cities they elect urban 
neighbourhood residents’ committee and property owners’ committee members 
instead of village committee members. (Ogden. 2002; 220-221) 
The reason behind this significant different in power is that the administrative 
structure survived the economic decentralisation in the cities, unlike on the 
countryside. Housing, tax collection, sanitation, security, population control were 
still handled by the city administration or indirectly by the city through the work 
unit and work units in turn largely overlap the neighbourhood residents’ 
committees, making the later a subordinate to the work unit. The committees were 
made simply to deal with everyday matters, such as enforcing compliance with 
the birth control policy and delivering the newspapers.  But with time more 
responsibilities have been handed down to the committees as work units spin off 
non-productive activities. (Ibid; 222-23) 
But since these committee positions are not very desired by the people, the 
elections are sometimes ignored and the sitting members recruit the new members 
by themselves instead. This as less than 23 percent of the urban population would 
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actually like to be elected. 32,7 percent of city voters didn’t think it mattered who 
they voted for and over 35 percent only votes to fill their obligations as citizens.  
The property owners’ committees, which were created in the mid-1990’s due to 
the decision to privatise work-unit houses, are however more popular and active 
than the residents’ committees. This as they are both much freer from the state 
and the state only has indirect influence over these committees, and because the 
residents are much more assertive about their property right than general political 
rights they are much more motivated to participate. (Ibid; 220-22, 227)  
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5 Conclusion 
This finale chapter concludes the paper. It is divided into three parts, the first part 
is a summarisation of the analysis. The second evaluates the different theories 
discussed in the second chapter, basing the evaluation on the analysis in chapter 
four. The third, and last, part is an over all conclusion in which the research 
question is finally given a direct answer.   
5.1 Summarisation: The impact of the economical 
development on China’s democratisation 
As Lipset determined his standpoint by observing various indicators of economic 
development I determined mine by observing indicators for intermediate 
democracy and their causes.  
Looking at the developments concerning political rights and freedom it is 
plain to see that they are limited. But also that the economical developments, 
more than anything else, have played an important role in the changes that has 
occurred. Today foreign television channels and can be found broadcasting news 
and entertainment in the country, though they have to abide by state regulations, 
and Internet access is available to anyone with a telephone. The people have been 
given access to en hole new world that in the future might also awake the desire 
for democracy. Information and discussions that previously would have sent 
people to work camps are now openly discussed on television, radio and on the 
Internet. As the economy began to open up so did flow of information as 
foreigners needed the to be able to observe the Chinese market to dare to make 
investments and the Chinese needed to be able to observe foreign markets be able 
to tempt investors. While some regulations remain to ensure stability within the 
country and stop possible uprisings against the Chinese state, this is still a 
development that may aid future political liberalisation as it has already aided the 
economical. But it is not only the information access that has improves, people are 
now allowed to choose their own jobs and are given choices that did not 
previously exist, all because of the economic development. These choices may in 
the future cause a desire to be able to make choices concerning politics and who 
will govern, but for now the Chinese people seem rather content with the choices 
they can make. 
But when it comes to political choices the selection is very limited. The 
economic development did not do much to promote such choices. The political 
elite chooses the political elite. The only elected bodies that can be found in China 
today are the rural village committees and urban neighbourhood residence’ 
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committees and property owners’ committees. These are responsible for the 
lowest level of government and many of their duties are done by ordinary civil 
servants rather than elected bodies in other countries. As to weather these 
elections are a result of economic development is questionable. The installation of 
the elections in rural areas was an attempt to regain control of these areas. The 
fact that the rural committees hold more power than their urban counterparts can 
be seen as proof of this. The state was struggling with their control of the rural 
areas, not the urban and yet the rural gain more “freedom” from the state than the 
urban does. This if nothing else could make one question the government’s 
motives. 
5.2 Theoretic evaluation 
The goal with the reforms was to liberalise the economy and in this sense the 
government has no doubt been extremely successful, the economical development 
has been extraordinary. China went from having a GDP per capita just above $250 
to just below $6000 in less than 30 years. If one should choose to believe 
Przeworski and Limonfi’s threshold theory (and the International Money Fund’s 
predictions of a per capita of $6378 in 2009) this would mean that the chance for 
democratisation in China would now start to diminish. But then again, this 
prediction can be questioned in the case of China as the only real vocalisation of 
the desire to democratise that has happened there came in 1989 and was violently 
stopped and the likelihood for something like that to happen back then would, 
according to this theory, be vey small as the likelihood of a authoritarian regime 
dying during any year with a per capita under $1000 has a likelihood of 0.0066 
while the likelihood for such an event was as high as 0.0641 in 2007 and 2008.  
Which were both two rather peaceful years in China.  
Democratisation should be the next step in Chinese politics if one would listen 
to Moore. Due to the industrialisation and economic success the cities are nearly 
drowning in internal migrates from the countryside, and China is becoming less 
and less dependent on agriculture, which would fit nicely with his desired 
circumstances. As does the “replenishment of upper-class interests around the 
dominance of commercial and industrial interest”, yet China remain authoritarian. 
Maybe this is due to the government’s decision to liberalise the economy and 
hand over, rather than forcing the upper-class to forcefully take over, the 
commercial and industrial market before the upper-class began to take an interest 
on their own.  
Lipset’s hypothesis does not seem to have much merit in the Chinese case 
either. While the country is becoming more educated and richer no democratic 
change is demanded by the masses, the increased freedom is due to government 
decisions, except perhaps the election in rural areas but to say that it was because 
of a desire for a democratic revolution might also be stretching it. 
O’Donnell’s theory however might hold more merit than those above since the 
middleclass in China shows very little interest in changing things now that the 
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economic development is going strong, and care little for increasing their political 
rights and freedom, but this could be because the rich are favoured by the 
government, and their minority status could be the reason behind their political 
inactivity as increased democracy might change this. But the inactivity could just 
as easily be because of the Chinese culture or something else, rather than fear of 
the lower classes, since the poor too do little to attempt to change the political 
climate. 
5.3 Overall conclusion 
As said earlier, there is no doubt that China has become freer in the last 30 years, 
but rather than this being a result of the economical development, the economic 
development is a result of the increased freedom. While the Chinese may have 
been granted more social and economical freedom than before, they still have a 
long way to go before gaining political freedom.  
The reason China has liberalised economically, and not politically, is because 
configuration of the reforms. While the economic liberalisation may have caused 
some indirect political liberalisation, which some have misinterpreted as signs of 
democratisation, the liberalisation’s main task was to aid economic development 
and nothing else. The government’s willingness to do this, to give up some of its 
power, has made it possible for it to keep the overwhelming majority of it, 
improve China’s economy, and please the people all at once and without too sever 
internal complaints. 
But fact is that it is impossible for the economical development in China to 
keep the current pace in the long run. When it slows down this may cause the 
people to rise against the authoritarian regime, as they have seen that increasing 
the freedom already helped once. That is if no democratic uprising happens before 
that, based on something else then economic development. But for now; the 
economical development is enough and the Communist Party’s autocratic rule 
remains, perhaps even strengthened by the partial liberalisation. 
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